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Abstract
The governments of many developed economies are confronting a number of policy
issues associated with ageing populations. For example, pension reforms, increasing
the labour force participation of older workers and increasing the standard retirement
age are various policy reforms suggested by the OECD to cope with the fiscal strain
associated with ageing populations. However, many of the same governments now
embracing these reforms had until recent times allowed the early exit of older workers
from the labour force by various means in periods of excess labour supply, leading to
the allegation that these governments had treated older workers as a ‘reserve army of
labour’. In this paper panel models for the labour force participation of males aged
55-59 and 60-64 years in 12 OECD countries are estimated as a function of social
security and labour market variables covering the time period 1967 to 2007. In
contrast to previous OECD modelling, allowances are made for both country specific
intercept and slope terms in various specifications, thereby allowing the incorporation
of unique aspects of each country’s social security system or labour market. In
addition, both long run models and also short run models incorporating error
correction terms are estimated. The findings suggest that the ‘one size fits all’ policy
advocated by the OECD is inadequate to address country specific factors affecting
older worker labour force participation. The recent pension reforms are now out of
character with the reserve army of labour explanation and results also imply that
governments in many OECD countries will struggle to increase older male labour
force participation through pension policy reform alone, without addressing the
important role of the aggregate labour market.
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1. Introduction
A demographic shift toward an older age profile in many developed economies
presents their governments with a number of policy challenges. Such ageing societies
face issues associated with changing consumption patterns, labour force participation,
healthcare and pension usage. As such, population ageing has inspired research and
analysis of older workers’ labour force participation and pension usage in both those
countries affected by ageing populations as well as by international institutions. The
primary consideration is that an increasing proportion of the older population,
traditionally reliant upon publically funded pensions and healthcare, and a decreasing
proportion of the population in the traditional workforce age group paying income
tax, has been projected to place strain on future government budgets.

Three international institutions that advocate alternative ageing society policies to
address labour force participation of older workers and pension reform are the World
Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and
International Labour Organization (ILO). The World Bank recommends a gradual
shift away from publicly managed pay-as-you-go schemes. Instead, a multiple pillar
retirement income system is advocated, consisting of a mandatory publicly managed
unfunded scheme supported by a privately managed funded scheme, and
supplemented by voluntary savings schemes (World Bank 1994, Holzmann 1998).

The OECD recommends both welfare reform and increasing labour force participation
of older workers (OECD 1995, 1998, Blöndal and Scarpetta 1998, Casey 1998,
Burniaux et al. 2004, Duval 2003). The OECD research contends that older worker
labour force participation had fallen over recent decades because of generous social
security benefit levels and eligibility criteria, encouraging older workers to exit the
labour force prematurely. Therefore, the removal of pensions that allow early exit
from the labour force, reduced financial incentives for early exit, and increasing the
standard age of retirement are their proposed policies to reduce fiscal exposure and
increase older worker labour force participation rates.

In contrast, the ILO advocates a full employment strategy, anti age discrimination
action, and flexible retirement age policies (ILO 1995, 2003, Auer and Fortuny 2000).
Furthermore, the ILO largely rejects the rationale for the move from public to private
2

funded retirement income schemes suggested by other institutions (Gillion 1998).
However, it is apparent that most countries have adhered to the OECD and World
Bank strategies of trying to reduce government responsibility for pension financing,
then attempting to increase older worker labour force participation through addressing
social security availability and the financial incentives for early exit inherent in
various social security schemes.

Government efforts to either encourage or discourage labour force participation of
certain groups brings us the concept of the ‘reserve army of labour’, a phrase
attributed to Marx (Power 1983). In contrast to ‘orthodox’ economists who would
emphasise a microeconomic focus and financial incentives associated with non-wage
forms of income such as pensions and private saving for older worker labour force
participation, other labour market economists contend that the State plays an active
role in manipulating the labour force status of marginalised groups or segments of
labour such as older workers in response to aggregate labour market conditions (for
example, Offe and Hinrichs 1985, Laczko and Phillipson 1991 and Peck 1996). They
contend that older workers form a segment of the labour market that can be removed
from the labour force in periods of labour supply surplus and mobilised into the
labour force during periods of labour supply shortages through government policy
mechanisms. At the heart of this rationale is that reserve army of labour mobilisation
reduces constraints to increased production and reduces wage pressures for capitalists.
This army is then deemed expendable in periods of production decline.

There are two main aspects to the research presented here. First, we present the
background to recent policy reforms expected to affect older worker labour force
participation. Then we look at the trends evident in labour participation of older
workers in OECD countries and analyse various theoretical explanations for such. A
clear divide is evident between orthodox theories that emphasis a microeconomic
reaction to financial incentives for the work/leisure choice which are prevalent in the
US literature versus more non-orthodox theories such as the reserve army of labour
hypothesis which emphasise macroeconomic and institutional forces external to the
individual which are more common in explaining older worker participation trends in
European literature.
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The second part of the research involves quantitative modelling of the influences of
social security and labour market variables upon the labour force participation rates of
older male workers (aged 55 to 64 years) for selected OECD countries. In contrast to
previous OECD modelling, allowances are made for both country specific intercepts
and slope terms in various model specifications. In addition, we analyse stationarity
and cointegration issues which were also neglected in the previous OECD modelling
of Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) and Duval (2003), allowing the estimation of both
long run models, and short run dynamic models incorporating error correction
mechanisms.

Recent pension reforms to increase labour force participation of older workers
primarily in response to ageing population concerns rather than labour market
conditions do not neatly fit the reserve army of labour concept. Furthermore, model
results show that some pension reforms suggested by the OECD would appear to be
ineffective policy tools to stimulate older worker labour force participation in many
countries. This implies that some OECD governments will struggle to mobilise older
in response to ageing society policy pressures through pension reform alone without
addressing the role of the aggregate labour market. Thus, the findings suggest that
many countries may benefit from accepting ILO policy recommendations to stimulate
aggregate labour demand rather than rely solely on OECD recommendations
addressing the supply side only.

The research is presented as follows: Section 2 presents the background to the
demographic ageing of OECD populations and associated policy considerations.
Section 3 presents the trends for older male labour force participation rates in OECD
countries while also introducing competing explanatory theories. Section 4 presents
the methodology employed in this study with Section 5 presenting the estimation
results of a number of econometric models. Section 6 concludes with a summary of
findings and policy implications.
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2. Population Ageing and the Policy Platforms of the World Bank, OECD and
ILO
An ageing society is observed when there is a relative increase in older age groups’
population (generally aged 65 years and over) amongst the general population leading
to an increase in average age. The populations of many developed economies are
experiencing such a demographic phenomenon as a result of both declining fertility
rates and increased life expectancy. For example, the average fertility rate in OECD
countries has declined from above 3.23 children per woman aged 15-49 years in 1960
to below 1.65 in 2006. Ceteris paribus, a fertility rate of 2.1 is required to maintain
population stability. Turkey and Mexico are the only two OECD countries to have
fertility rates above 2.1. The ageing population is exacerbated by increasing life
expectancy, with the OECD average life expectancy increasing from 65.8 and 70.8
years in 1960 to 76 and 81.7 years in 2006 for males and females respectively (OECD
2009a). Apart from the declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy, ageing
of OECD country populations is intensifying as a large proportion of the population,
comprising the baby boomer generation (born between 1946 and 1960) gradually age,
and reach the mandatory retirement age (generally 65 years) between 2011 and 2025.

The main policy concern anticipated for the governments of countries experiencing
ageing populations was of supporting a growing proportion of older citizens
traditionally reliant on the public purse for social security pensions and health
expenditures. Coexisting with this situation, of course, is a smaller proportion of the
population in the traditional working ages of between 15 and 64 years of age.
Therefore, while the proportion of the population traditionally ‘dependent’ on social
expenditure spending was expected to increase, the proportion of persons ‘active’ and
working, and thereby forming the traditional income tax base to fund such
expenditure, was expected to shrink. At the very least, this situation was expected to
put strain on governments’ budgets to finance its social security and health
obligations. At the extreme, this situation was speculated to lead to intergenerational
conflict from a younger minority financially supporting an ageing majority (Johnson
et al. 1989). This situation became further complicated by early retirement or exit
trends of older workers (aged 55-64 years) that emerged from the 1970’s onward.
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A simple measure of the relative size of the older population traditionally reliant on
social security pensions and healthcare relative to the size of the labour force aged tax
base is the old age dependency ratio. It is calculated as the percentage of so called
‘inactives’ aged 65 and over, to the labour force aged population (generally 15 to 64
years). Burniaux et al. (2004) projected the average OECD dependency ratio to
increase from 26.5% in 2000 to 41.9% in 2025. There is quite a large amount of
variation in these old age dependency ratios between OECD countries, however, all
are projected to increase substantially over this time period. Some countries such as
Belgium, Finland, France, Poland and Sweden are projected to have dependency
ratios in excess of 50% in 2025. Of note is that these projections do not take into
account the aforementioned early exit trends of those prior to the age of 65 prevalent
in many OECD countries.

Because of population ageing, older worker labour force participation rates and social
security pension reliance have emerged as important policy issues. As such, a number
of international institutions have suggested, and national governments implemented,
various social security pension reforms aimed at restricting pension eligibility and
increasing the labour force participation rates for older workers. Three international
institutions have contributed to policy platforms to address ageing populations,
namely, the World Bank, the OECD, and the ILO. Each has a different political
agenda and policy recommendations, and thus different implications for older male
labour force participation rates and social security pension use.

The World Bank’s role in pension policy reform comes from its direct role as a lender
to countries with dysfunctional pension systems, such as those in Latin America, and
Central and Eastern Europe. The World Bank recommends a gradual shift away from
publicly managed pay-as-you-go schemes that are unfunded and the norm in these
countries. Instead, a multiple pillar retirement income system is advocated, consisting
of a mandatory publicly managed unfunded scheme supported by a privately managed
funded scheme, and supplemented by voluntary savings schemes (World Bank 1994,
Holzmann 1998). The World Bank has the power to influence this outcome of a
multiple pillar retirement income system by making it a condition of a borrowing
country’s reform proposals. However, because they are primarily lenders to
governments in dire circumstances, their power only spreads to a relative few
6

countries. Therefore, many of the advanced OECD economies facing ageing
population profiles will not be directly affected by the World Bank’s policy position.

In contrast, the OECD policy reforms directly address more affluent or developed
nations. Their policy reform research focuses predominantly on supply side issues and
its evolution can be described as a three part process. First, the identification of the
future budget exposure posed by an ageing society, especially from publicly funded
pensions. Second, the role of the availability and financial value of pensions available
to those aged 55-64 for explaining the decline in older labour force participation was
established. Finally, this research was used to justify the primary role of pension
reform for reversing early retirement trends via restrictions to eligibility and lower
social security pension value, thereby justifying a diminishing role for public pension
financing.

Government budget exposure to an ageing society through the provision of publicly
funded pensions and health care to its citizens was established by the OECD via
simulation results in Leibfritz et al. (1995). Similarly, Rosevare et al. (1996) projected
pension and health outlays to 2030 for OECD countries under various assumptions.
The disincentives for continued work in social security systems theme was established
in OECD (1995). They gave emphasis to the availability and financial value of State
provided pensions prior to standard retirement age, such as from unemployment or
disability related pensions, as incentives to leave employment. Blöndal and Scarpetta
(1998) provided econometric evidence of the magnitude of financial disincentives for
labour force participation of inherent within social security pensions and the scope for
an increase in older male labour force participation rates from the removal of such.
More recently, Duval (2003) continued this line of research by estimating the
financial disincentives for longer labour force participation of older workers via the
‘implicit tax rate’ on labour force participation in social security pensions for those
aged greater than 55. As such, pension reforms suggested by the OECD consist of
three main avenues: i) removal of pensions that allow early retirement; ii) a move
toward actuarial neutrality of pension systems; iii) convergence of retirement ages to
67 years (Burniaux et al. 2004).

Of note is that OECD (1995) discussed employment disadvantages of older workers
7

such as the greater likelihood of becoming separated from employment involuntarily,
and remaining so. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that this situation was often
addressed by government policy intervention to remove the older unemployed from
the labour market in the face of high aggregate unemployment levels. Therefore, these
findings seem to recognise the role of labour demand and aggregate labour market
conditions for declining older worker labour force participation rates, however, apart
from Casey (1998) no policy recommendations have been suggested by the OECD to
address such.

The ILO has had a longer association with older worker interests than the other
international institutions. The ILO was instrumental in improving invalid pensions for
older workers in the 1930’s, in promoting policies for early retirement, training and
placement of older workers in the 1960’s, and supporting job protection for older
workers in the 1970’s. The ILO Older Worker Policy Recommendations established
in 1980 included older workers being placed within a strategy of full employment and
ensuring unemployment is not shifted from one group to another; anti age
discrimination legislation and access to employment that takes into account their
skills, experience and qualifications; measures to enable older workers to continue in
employment under satisfactory conditions; and a gradual transition to retirement and
flexible age of old age pension receipt (ILO 1995, 2003, Auer and Fortuny 2000).

A central part of the ILO mandate is social security systems in general, and pensions
in particular. In this respect, the ILO recommendations are out of step with the OECD
and World Bank, with the ILO questioning the shift from public to privately managed
schemes, where benefits levels are not guaranteed and may be based on interest rates
or other financial market returns (Gillion 1998). Furthermore, the emphasis on a full
employment policy and anti-age discrimination legislation sets the ILO apart from the
World Bank and the OECD. However, it is apparent in Table 1 that governments have
largely adhered to OECD recommendations of pension reforms, with aggregate
demand stimulus policies only utilised by many governments recently to combat the
global financial crisis, not to address ageing society considerations.
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Table 1. Recent Pension Reform Policies in Selected OECD Countries
Country

Pension Reform

Australia

Superannuation Guarantee Scheme became mandatory in 1992.
Removal of Mature Age Allowance.
Restrictions to Disability Support Pension eligibility.
Increase in standard age of retirement for women from 60 to 65.
Proposed increase in standard age of retirement to 67 years.
Austria
Decline in accrual rate of pension and increase in number of
contribution years to reach maximum replacement rate.
Belgium
Standard age of retirement for women increased from 60 to 65.
Finland
Reforms to old age and early retirement schemes to reduce implicit
taxes on continued work.
France
Lower implicit taxes on continued work beyond the age of 60.
Increase in contribution period to receive full pension.
Germany
Actuarial reduction adjustment for early retirement at 63, and actuarial
increases for deferred retirement effective by 2004.
Actuarial reduction to unemployment pension available at age 60.
Increase in retirement age to 67.
Italy
Lower implicit taxes on continued work up to the age of 65.
Japan
Rise in minimum retirement age from 60 to 65 by 2025.
Contribution rates increased.
Switzerland Standard age of retirement for women to increase from 62 to 64.
UK
Reduction in annual accrual rate in State Earnings Related Pension
Scheme.
US
Standard retirement age to rise from 65 to 67 from 2000-2022.
Source: Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998), Burniaux et al. (2004), Duval (2003)

3. Older Worker Labour Force Participation Trends and Theoretical
Explanations
OECD countries face different policy challenges from ageing populations associated
with their older worker labour force participation trends, social security pension
systems, and stage of population ageing. The average labour force participation rates
over time for OECD, European and North American countries are displayed in Figure
1. The two age groups 55-59 and 60-64 years are presented separately as there are
different patterns evident as well as different pension eligibility rules for these age
groups. As expected, the labour force participation rates for males aged 60-64 years
are noticeably lower than those for aged 55-59. In addition, a more dramatic trend
decline in labour force participation rates is evident for those aged 60-64 from the
1970’s to the 1990’s compared to a more gradual decline for those aged 55-59 years.
An increase in labour force participation is observed after the year 2000, particularly
for those aged 60-64. Finally, labour force participation rates in Europe are noticeably
9

lower than for the OECD average, with rates in North America marginally higher.
However, this aggregated data conceals a great deal of variation at the individual
country level.

Figure 1. Labour Force Participation Rates for Males Aged 55-59 and 60-64
(1960 to 2008)
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Source: OECD (2009b)

Theoretical explanations for older worker labour force participation rates include roles
for labour supply choice, labour demand, and/or State social security and labour force
participation policies. The basic orthodox model of labour force participation derived
from the general model of consumer demand, entailing the individual’s decision
between work and leisure emphasises the individual’s response to relative price
(financial) variables, which in turn are conditioned by their tastes and preferences for
work and leisure (Hicks 1946). These propositions are generally estimated using
micro level data. The basic static model has been extended to a dynamic framework
with the lifecycle model of labour force participation (for example, Ghez and Becker
1975).
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Alternative theories argue that elements left exogenous to this labour supply choice
model are fundamental to explaining older male labour force participation. That is,
labour demand and the institutional framework. These include the neoclassical labour
demand theory and segmented labour market theory, addressing the firm’s design of
financial incentives, as well as the potential role of structural changes to industry
employment and changes to employer labour use strategies within industries (for
example, Lazear 1979, Standing 1986, 1997, O’Brien 2005). Other labour market
related explanations include the discouraged worker hypothesis and the reserve army
of labour explanations. These final explanations emphasise the state of the aggregate
labour market, a disadvantaged or marginalised position for older workers, and/or the
systematic manipulation of the labour force status of older workers by government
policy makers (for example, Bowen and Finegan 1969, Standing 1978, Peck 1996).
These latter theories suggest an extreme lack of choice for older workers’ labour force
outcomes particularly in the face of aggregate labour supply surplus with the reserve
army of labour explanation also emphasising the selective way labour markets can be
manipulated by policy makers.

O’Brien (2001a) showed a clear divide in the literature between prevalent theoretical
explanations emphasised in US versus European literature. A perusal of US literature
on older worker participation reveals the apparent unfettered operation of the lifecycle
model of labour supply, thereby emphasising preferences and the individual or family
unit’s response to financial influences. This literature established the role for rising
wealth and an income effect, generous social security and (private) pensions, and poor
health (for example, Fields and Mitchell 1984, Hausman and Wise 1985, Stock and
Wise 1990). Further research suggested that the influence of poor health had been an
illusion. With the ‘correct’ health variable measurement, this decision was also
dominated by financial variables (Bazzoli 1985, Costa 1996). This paradigm also
suggested job loss resulted in an increase in the expected retirement age (Chan and
Stevens 1999). US empirical models have typically incorporated increasing dynamic
and structural complexity over time, again reflecting the lifecycle model, and in part
reflecting the availability of longitudinal data (Leonesio 1996).

In a special AER issue Gruber and Wise (1998), Kapteyan and De Vos (1998),
Blundell and Johnson (1998), and Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998) emphasised the
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financial incentives in social security, or more specifically the financial disincentives
for continued work, in explaining older workers’ labour force participation across 11,
mostly European countries, with the exceptions of the US and Japan. They found that
the accrual of benefits with continued work and the age at which benefits are available
were the most important determinants. Findings indicated an implicit tax on continued
employment in all countries, thereby providing a financial incentive to exit the labour
force. Furthermore, Gruber and Wise (1998) showed that differences in this implicit
tax rate explained the majority of the differences between the included countries’
older worker participation rates. Of note was that the US and Japan shared a low
implicit tax and low unused capacity of older workers, compared to high implicit
taxes and high unused capacity in most European countries. Finally, they pointed to
evidence that changes in social security provision preceded changes to labour force
participation. This implied that early retirement trend could be reversed by changes to
social security programs that had induced these early retirement trends.

However, most other literature exploring European countries’ older worker labour
force participation emphasises a marginalised position of older workers in the labour
market, aggregate labour supply surplus and that State policy subsequently reacted to
this by allowing older unemployed workers to exit the labour force, as well as actively
removing employed older workers in favour of youth employment. Standing (1986)
and Westergaard et al. (1989) suggested that prolonged excess aggregate labour
supply, the dismantling of the ‘last in first out’ principle and other protection offered
to older workers within the internal labour market, and employment restructuring
away from internal labour market practices were influential in explaining UK older
worker labour force participation. Rather than a voluntary early retirement trend, the
involuntary nature of the retirement decision was emphasised, and lower labour force
participation was associated with discouraged worker explanations.

Casey and Laczko (1989) questioned the mere description of trends as early
retirement, noting the large role of involuntary job loss, instead describing observed
trends more accurately as long term unemployment. Laczko and Phillpson (1991)
findings also challenged the simple version of the orthodox model of work-leisure
predictions, describing the prevalence of a labour force state as ‘early exit’,
representing an indeterminate status between the traditional two states of employment
12

and traditional retirement age at 65. Early exit was distinguished from early
retirement, the former being associated with unemployment, especially for the low
skilled and low educated in contracting industries. Laczko and Phillpson thus
characterised the older age segment of the labour force as a ‘reserve army of labour’.

The concept of the reserve army of labour was proposed by Karl Marx (Power 1983).
The existence and persistence of business cycles or crises was fundamental to Marx’s
depiction of a capitalist economy. Furthermore, Marx argued that a reserve army of
(surplus) labour was required for, and was the product of, capitalist production and
accumulation. The ability to mobilise marginal labour to the labour force was
desirable for capitalists, as it allowed expansion of production without running into
labour supply constraints and also kept wages down. This reserve army of labour was
then deemed expendable in periods of downturn or stagnation, until required for the
next expansion phase. According to Marx, the State protects the interests of the
capitalists. Therefore, the key proposition to establish is whether the government is an
active party to the manipulation of older workers’ labour force status according to
aggregate labour market conditions. That is, older male workers being systematically
removed from the labour force in periods of sustained high unemployment, and
coerced into participation in periods of tighter labour market conditions via policy
mechanisms. Researchers have noted the role of aggregate unemployment for some
European governments’ older worker labour supply policy, such as ‘job release
schemes’ in France, Germany and the UK in the 1980’s. Job release schemes offered
employers financial incentives and allowed older workers to retire on a State
sponsored pension if replaced by a targeted group, such as a youth or long-term
unemployed person. This was in contrast to policy measures designed to keep older
workers active after World War 2 in the face of labour shortages (Westergaard et al.
1989). Other policies may be more passive in nature such as the availability of social
security specifically for older people in periods of labour supply surplus and the
removal of such in periods of labour supply shortages.

This reserve army of labour explanation has also found acceptance among third
generation segmented labour market theorists such as Offe and Hinriches (1985),
Rubery (1992) and Peck (1996). Older male workers may form a segment of the
labour force that can be manipulated as a reserve army of labour by the State. The
13

design of social security pensions specifically for older recipients with eligibility
reflecting unemployment during periods of poor labour market conditions as part of
welfare policy would provide one such avenue. As with the discouraged worker
explanation, a weak position in the labour market would be a precondition to the
availability of such an avenue of labour force exit for older workers. Furthermore, it
may be seen as socially acceptable to target older males as the reserve army if they are
subject to employment difficulties, have the alternative role of early retirement, or
could be seen as freeing up employment for other deserving groups such as the youth.

Notably, the use of older worker early exit policies in periods of excess labour supply
was not evident in all European countries. Stille (1999) noted that older worker labour
force participation rates in countries allowing early exit measures tend to be
substantially lower than prime-age participation rates, with little difference between
older and prime-aged unemployment rates. Examples of such countries include
Belgium, France, Italy, and The Netherlands. In contrast, other European nations not
encouraging early exit in times of high unemployment exhibit similar labour force
participation rates for all age groups, but substantially higher unemployment rates for
older workers versus prime age.

The reserve army of labour explanation is quite prevalent in qualitative research but
has not been specifically tested in empirical research. Testable propositions would
first entail a relationship between older worker labour force participation rates and
aggregate labour market conditions or constraints, thus establishing the discouraged
worker effect as a precondition. In addition, State policy supporting this relationship
directly via job release schemes or more indirectly with the availability of early exit
routes in periods of excess labour supply, whereas orthodox theory would emphasise
the financial generosity of social security affecting older worker participation rate.

In summary, a stylised characterisation of US literature would emphasise the apparent
unfettered operation of the lifecycle model with individual choice and reaction to
financial variables. European literature suggests a greater role for the labour market
and government policy. These forces can also be captured in a lifecycle model of
labour supply, however, it does suggest the predominance of uncertainty and
constraints, the environment, or other exogenous variables, rather than the simpler
14

orthodox model of work-leisure choice. As such, the discouraged worker and reserve
army of labour explanations are prevalent in European literature to explain older
worker participation trends.

4. Methodology
A panel econometric model will be specified and estimated in this paper capturing 12
OECD countries and annual data covering the period 1967 to 2007. In line with the
above discussion of various explanations of older worker labour force participation
over time we assume that older male labour force participation rates are a function of
financial variables that may ‘pull’ workers from the labour force in line with orthodox
theory, as well as aggregate labour market constraints that may ‘push’ workers out
which are more attune to discouraged worker and reserve army of labour
explanations. Separate models are estimated for males aged 55-59 and 60-64 years
which take into account different age eligibility rules that may be present in early
retirement routes as well as the different standard age for receipt of countries’ old age
pension. The basic fixed effects models are specified as follows:
LFPRkit = β 0 + β1 ( ITAXK it or SSRRit ) + β 2 RETAGEit + β 3UNEMPit + β 4 PRIMEit + γ i + ε it (1)

where k denotes the age group 55-59 years or 60-64 years, i denotes an OECD
country (i = 1, …, 12), t represents time (1967 to 2007), LFPR denotes labour force
participation rates of older males aged 55-59 or 60-64 years, ITAXK is the implicit
tax (%) on 5 years continued work in the ‘early retirement’ route for each age group,
SSRR is the social security replacement rate of unemployment benefits (%), RETAGE
is the standard retirement age for receipt of the old age pension, UNEMP denotes the
prime aged (25 – 54 years) male unemployment rate (%), and PRIME represents the
percentage of prime age males to the population of males aged 15 to 64 years.

Two alternative variable specifications are included in the specification to capture
financial incentives for early labour force exit in countries’ social security pension
systems, namely, the implicit tax on continued work (ITAXK) and the replacement
rates of unemployment benefits (SSRR). Following the work of Gruber and Wise
(1998), Kapteyan and De Vos (1998), Blundell and Johnson (1998), Börsch-Supan
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and Schnabel (1998), and more recently Duval (2003), the implicit taxes on continued
work, ITAX55 and ITAX60, are calculated as the change in net pension wealth from
working an additional 5 years at ages 55 and 60, respectively (expressed as a
percentage).

1

If additional contributions outweigh additional benefits an implicit tax

is present. In theory the effect of this variable should be ambiguous because of
opposing income and substitution effects, however, evidence suggests that implicit
taxes will have an inverse effect on labour force participation (Lumsdaine and
Mitchell 1999). The implicit tax is calculated for ‘typical early retirement’ routes such
as early retirement pensions, disability pensions, and unemployment related pensions
that can be taken prior allowing exit from the labour force prior to receipt of the old
age pension. OECD reform policies entail a reduction of this implicit tax.

The social security replacement rate of unemployment benefits expressed as a
percentage (SSRR) was also used as a proxy for the financial generosity of social
security available as a non-wage source of income. Again, we would expect a
negative coefficient if social security generosity entices workers from the labour
force. The replacement rate is used to represent social security value relative to
potential labour market earnings to take into account the work/non participation
choice of older individuals. This particular measure is also expected to be a good
proxy of social security available to older males including disability pensions and
early retirement pensions during the period of analysis. First, replacement rates from
unemployment benefits are significantly positively correlated to other nonemployment benefit schemes such as disability pensions, which are the predominant
form of non-employment benefit used by those aged 55-64 years. Second, many
unemployment benefit schemes available to older males do not entail active job
search. In such cases recipients are expected occupy the ‘not in the labour force’
status in labour force surveys.

This replacement rate is calculated by the OECD as the average of the gross
unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family
situations and three durations of unemployment (Martin 1996). Therefore, this
measure takes into account schemes with short duration such as the US and Canada
1

The implicit tax data was obtained directly from Duval. Greater detail of the calculation of this data is
given in Appendix 2 from Duval (2003).
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with a lower value. However, in 1995 over half of OECD countries allowed
individuals to draw on unemployment related benefits from the age of 55 to the
standard retirement age (Blöndal and Scarpetta 1998). We use ITAXK and SSRR in
alternative specifications as we would expect a high positive correlation between the
two variables. The replacement rate directly captures the income replacement effect
while the implicit tax captures age eligibility and pension accrual.

The standard retirement age (RETAGE) was included to account for variation in old
age pension receipt eligibility. It is generally the age of 65 years in most countries,
however, some countries such as Canada, France and Italy is as low as 60 in some
years. In these latter countries we would expect a lower labour force participation rate
for those aged 60-64. This variable has taken on increased relevance in recent years in
light of OECD policy recommendations to increase standard retirement age to 67
years. It was also used in the model for males aged 55-59 years on an experimental
basis to see if it has any noticeable effect on the labour force participation of older
workers not necessarily close to standard retirement age.

Cyclical labour force discouragement is captured by the UNEMP variable, the
unemployment rate of prime aged males. We would expect a negative coefficient if
labour force discouragement is a significant influence. Prime aged males are used for
this measure to avoid endogeneity, with the labour force participation rate of older
males being jointly determined with unemployment rates. Also, past research has
shown a significant role for hidden unemployment for older male labour force
participation, therefore the use of older male unemployment rates (which, by
definition, conceal hidden unemployment) would not adequately capture this effect
(for example Beatty et al. 2000, Fothergill 2001, O’Brien 2001b).

As first proposed in Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998), the percentage of prime aged males
within the working age male population (PRIMEPR) is included in this specification
as an additional aggregate labour market constraint. This influence is similar to the
long-run rather than cyclical labour force discouragement concept proposed by
Standing (1978), the BLMR (1983) and Peck (1996). The hypothesis that any increase
in the proportion of prime aged males will crowd out older workers implies a negative
coefficient. This proposition rests on two assumptions. First, that prime aged workers
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are more attractive to employers than older workers, perhaps in terms of education
and productivity. Second, employers are rationing available jobs to those most
attractive within rigid labour market structures, with relative wages unable to adjust to
clear the market. This variable would appear to capture the pressures within many
European countries of employers and governments to squeeze out older workers from
the labour force in the face of persistent high unemployment in past recent decades
which also coincided with a proportional increase in prime aged workers from the
baby boomer generation.

The current model specification shares some similarities with the previous OECD
fixed effects panel models and combines the relative strengths of Blöndal and
Scarpetta (1998) and Duval (2003). However, the restriction imposed upon these
previous models to obtain common slope coefficients across all countries would
appear to be an over simplistic assumption given the unique features of OECD
countries’ labour force participation, social security systems and labour market
features, and underutilises the panel aspect of the data. Therefore, one of the
contributions of the current research is to allow the estimation of country specific
slope terms for TAXK and UNEMP, being the main policy variables suggested by the
OECD and ILO, respectively. We could not include country specific slope terms for
RETAGE because many countries have the age of 65 for all of 1967 to 2007, meaning
we would encounter multicollinearity issues with the constant term. We augment the
standard fixed effects models by allowing the ITAXK and UNEMP slope coefficient
restrictions to be relaxed in two separate models, thus preserving degrees of freedom.

Another issue not considered by previous OECD modelling is stationarity, unit root
testing and cointegration. This would appear to be a major shortcoming of previous
modelling considering the relatively long time series aspect of data used and the
availability of tests that can readily be conducted in contemporary econometrics
software packages. Furthermore, the inclusion of time trends in the models of Duval
(2003) may amount to a misspecification unless variables are time stationary.

The Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test (Levin et al. 2002) and the Breitung (BR) test
(Breitung 2000) assume a common unit root process across all cross sections. They
consider the basic ADF specification:
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pi

Δyit = α yit −1 + ∑ βij Δyit − j + X 'it δ + ε it

(2)

j =1

The assumption imposed is that α = ρ − 1 , while allowing the lag order for the
difference terms to vary. The null hypothesis assumes a unit root, with an alternative
hypothesis of no unit root:
H0 :α = 0
H1 : α < 1

(3)

The difference between the LLC and BR tests relates to how the α term is estimated.
In addition, there are a number of unit root tests that allow ρi to vary across different
countries, namely, the Im, Peraran and Shin (IPS) test (Im et al. 2003), and the FisherADF and Fisher-PP tests (Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001)). The null
hypothesis assumes a unit root for all i, with the alternative that some cross sections
(countries) do not have a unit root. As is standard practice in stationarity testing all
variables are first tested in their level form. If a unit root is present the test is then
repeated on the first differenced data. If the first differenced data is stationary then it
is deemed integrated of order 1, I(1).

It must be noted that no attempt has been made to allow for structural breaks in this
work. Perron (1989) noted that some unit root tests results may be biased to not
rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the presence of structural break(s),
however, panel unit root tests incorporating structural breaks have only been
formulated relatively recently (Im et al. 2005, and Hadri and Rao 2008) and are yet to
be incorporated in mainstream econometric software.

Non-stationary data (such as I(1)) should not be modelled in level format as a longrun relationship unless a linear combination of those variables is stationary. That is,
the variables are cointegrated (Engle and Granger 1987). If variables are nonstationary and modelled in their level form, there is a danger of spurious regression
results. The presence of a cointegrating relationship can be tested with unit root tests
of residuals from the long-run equation which should resemble white noise and be
I(0).
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If variables are cointegrated, a valid dynamic model specification is as an error
correction model (Engle and Granger 1987). This entails estimating a short run
relationship with variables specified in first differences and also including the lagged
residual (error correction term) from the long run model specified in levels. The
coefficient attached to the error correction term should be negative and thus represents
the speed of adjustment to the long run model. That is:
ΔLFPRkit = β0 + β1Δ( SSRRit or TAXKit ) + β 2 ΔRETAGEit + β3ΔUNEMPit + β 4 ΔPRIMEit + β5 ECM it −1 + γ i + ε it

(4)

where ECM is the stationary residual from the long run model.

Therefore, there are a number of contributions from the proposed modelling. First, we
relax parameter restrictions and allow both country specific intercepts (fixed effects)
and slope terms to further incorporate unique aspects of different OECD countries’
social security system and labour market characteristics. We can therefore simulate
changes to pensions suggested by the OECD or labour market suggested by the ILO
that are specific to each country. Second, we take into account the time series aspects
of the data that have been neglected in previous OECD modelling and address
stationarity issues with both unit root and cointegration tests of the data. In addition,
these tests are conducted for both the panel as a whole as well as for individual cross
sections (countries). Finally, we specify and estimate both the long run models and
short run dynamic models incorporating error correction mechanisms.

5. Data and empirical results
Most data for the included 12 OECD countries covering a maximum time period of
1967 to 2007 was collected directly from the OECD website (OECD 2009b). The data
for labour force participation, unemployment rates and population proportions were
able to be constructed from annual data available, however, the social security
replacement rates were only available biennially (OECD 2009c). Therefore, the
replacement rate data for alternate years was imputed by interpolation between
available years. This would appear to be appropriate given that there is little short
term volatility in this data. The implicit tax rates and standard retirement age data was
obtained directly from Romain Duval of the OECD (Duval 2003) for 1967 to 1999,
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2002 and 2004. Similarly, missing data for 2000, 2001 and 2003 was imputed by a
process of interpolation of available data. This data was not extrapolated beyond
2004, meaning that models incorporating the ITAXK variable are only estimated for
the 1967 to 2004 period. All variables were not available for all time periods for each
OECD country, thus the data used in the econometric models will be an unbalanced
panel. Included countries were chosen on the basis of data availability, with only
those countries with at least 25 years of observations of all variables chosen for
modelling. This left us with the 12 countries of Australia, Canada, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal Spain, Sweden and the US.

Descriptive statistics for each country are presented in Table 2. As expected, the
labour force participation rates are greater for those aged 55-59 than 60-64 years in all
countries. However, there is much greater variation in the 60-64 participation rates
over time. The generosity of social security varies greatly between the countries and is
generally higher in European countries compared to Australia, Canada and the US.
However, retirement age has been constant at 65 years for many countries (with a
standard deviation equal to zero). As mentioned previously, this feature precluded the
use of country specific RETAGE slope terms. Prime age unemployment rates average
less than ten percent in all countries, however, there is a relatively large amount of
variation over time, as expected, with cyclical fluctuations. Finally, the average
percentage of prime aged males amongst the labour force aged population is very
similar in most countries at around 62 to 64% and has moved very slowly over time,
as would be expected with demographic data.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the 12 OECD
Countries (1967 to 2007*)

Australia
Canada
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
US

LFPR55

LFPR 60

SSRR

ITAX 55

ITAX 60

RETAGE

UNEMP

PRIME

79.602
(6.964)
76.862
(4.182)
70.765
(9.087)
74.110
(8.354)
80.458
(4.615)
62.241
(6.444)
71.412
(7.634)
84.516
(2.319)
75.386
(4.103)
79.029
(5.648)
87.566
(3.301)
83.192
(3.875)

56.281
(12.209)
53.345
(7.263)
44.604
(18.303)
38.430
(21.829)
41.279
(12.877)
36.103
(12.877)
37.260
(17.307)
68.502
(6.703)
58.424
(7.637)
53.973
(11.633)
68.331
(8.727)
63.828
(9.398)

22.000
(4.059)
16.436
(3.023)
25.745
(12.327)
31.915
(6.527)
28.351
(1.671)
10.319
(12.891)
46.628
(10.507)
24.979
(15.165)
19.383
(19.392)
27.021
(11.302)
22.021
(11.302)
15.723
(9.229)

-0.108
(1.657)
1.521
(4.027)
55.647
(20.087)
49.161
(14.227)
40.568
(16.867)
54.950
(20.366)
54.298
(28.626)
13.003
(3.728)
33.666
(21.374)
58.225
(6.486)
28.247
(17.133)
5.343
(2.473)

3.345
(6.525)
5.822
(8.340)
57.317
(19.819)
69.821
(19.392)
44.564
(15.636)
83.780
(22.937)
73.882
(17.844)
13.647
(7.029)
50.741
(27.013)
66.033
(9.017)
48.332
(29.685)
9.360
(6.858)

65.000
(0.000)
62.561
(2.749)
65.000
(0.000)
61.890
(2.423)
65.195
(0.601)
61.305
(2.049)
65.000
(0.000)
67.329
(0.872)
65.000
(0.000)
65.000
(0.000)
65.463
(0.840)
65.000
(0.000)

4.453
(2.444)
7.175
(1.814)
5.604
(3.605)
5.210
(2.824)
5.155
(2.812)
3.969
(1.919)
4.516
(2.852)
2.529
(1.629)
3.598
(1.451)
8.955
(4.387)
3.305
(2.775)
4.401
(1.495)

62.060
(2.458)
63.466
(3.335)
62.130
(3.633)
61.669
(2.247)
63.404
(1.077)
64.184
(4.130)
63.335
(3.124)
63.634
(3.484)
59.792
(2.307)
62.466
(3.192)
62.947
(2.416)
62.706
(3.300)

Source: OECD (2009b), OECD (2009c), Duval (2003), author’s calculations
Mean with standard deviation in brackets
* ITAXK from 1967 to 2004

Unit root tests are presented in Table 3. The bulk of evidence suggests that all
variables are I(1) for both the panel and individual country. That is, a unit root present
in the level form of the variable with stationarity subsequently established in the first
difference of each variable.
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Table 3. Unit Root Tests
Unit Root Test
IPS
ADF
6.276
6.616
[1.000]
[1.000]
-15.366
217.631
ΔLFPR55it
[0.000]
[0.000]
7.324
11.254
LFPR 60it
[1.000]
[0.987]
-12.264
168.799
ΔLFPR60it
[0.000]
[0.000]
-0.577
34.751
SSRRit
[0.282]
[0.072]
-15.058
231.579
ΔSSRRit
[0.000]
[0.000]
3.873
23.354
ITAX 55it
[1.000]
[0.499]
-5.860
85.455
ΔITAX 55it
[0.000]
[0.000]
3.175
20.8554
ITAX 60it
[0.999]
[0.647]
-4.996
79.440
ΔITAX 60it
[0.000]
[0.000]
0.345
5.657
RETAGEit
[0.000]
[0.686]
-3.615
29.358
ΔRETAGEit
[0.000]
[0.000]
-0.768
31.843
PRIMEit
[0.221]
[0.131]
-4.367
72.596
ΔPRIMEit
[0.000]
[0.000]
-1.391
45.266
UNEMPit
[0.082]
[0.005]
-8.659
116.050
ΔUNEMPit
[0.000]
[0.000]
Test statistic reported with p-value in brackets
IPS = Im, Pesaran and Shin W-Stat
PP = Fisher PP
ADF = Fisher ADF
LLC = Levin, Lin and Chu
BR = Breitung
Variables
LFPR55it

PP
6.819
[1.000]
342.256
[0.000]
10.796
[0.990]
269.577
[0.000]
10.753
[0.991]
199.059
[0.000]
15.078
[0.919]
302.009
[0.000]
8.617
[0.998]
57.270
[0.000]
1.663
[0.990]
17.290
[0.000]
6.397
[1.000]
72.187
[0.000]
14.157
[0.943]
78.733
[0.000

LLC
3.600
[1.000]
-17.378
[0.000]
4.510
[1.000]
-13.739
[0.000]
0.381
[0.649]
-14.439
[0.000]
-1.027
[0.152]
-4.690
[0.000]
1.111
[0.867]
-5.318
[0.000]
-1.042
[0.149]
-4.442
[0.000]
-1.912
[0.028]
-3.570
[0.000]
0.452
[0.674]
-7.178
[0.000]

BR
5.178
[1.000]
-12.442
[0.000]
7.462
[1.000]
-8.295
[0.000]
0.949
[0.829]
-11.429
[0.000]
3.193
[0.999]
-1.579
[0.057]
5.123
[1.000]
-1.729
[0.042]
-0.393
[0.347]
-3.972
[0.000]
-0.764
[0.222]
-1.221
[0.111]
0.580
[0.719]
-6.805
[0.000]

The results from the estimated models are presented in Table 4 and 5 for males aged
55-59 and 60-64 years respectively. Models display relatively high adjusted R2
values, stationary residuals, and generally comparable statistically significant
coefficients across specifications for each age group, indicating quite robust results.
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Slope coefficients generally increase with age indicating that the labour force
participation of males aged 60-64 are more sensitive to both pension value and labour
market conditions.

Starting with the basic fixed effects models, estimation results indicate that an
increase in social security replacement rates (SSRR) of one percentage point will
decrease labour force participation rates by around 0.13 percentage points for males
55-59 and 0.28 percentage points for those aged 60-64. This is quite small in
magnitude and indicates that a decrease in replacement rates of 10 percentage points
will increase labour force participation of males 55-59 by less than 1.5 percentage
points and less than 3 percentage points for males 60-64 years. In comparison, a 10
percentage point decrease in implicit tax rates (ITAXK) will increase labour force
participation rates for males 55-59 by less than 1 percentage point and less than 1.5
percentage points for males aged 60-64. An increase in the standard retirement age of
2 years, as would be the case with most countries increasing retirement age from 65 to
67, would increase the labour force participation rate by up to 1.5 percentage point for
those 55-59, although this coefficient was much lower and statistically insignificant in
the model containing the implicit tax variable. As expected, it was estimated to have a
larger impact for those aged 60-64. However, its magnitude was also small, with an
increase in standard retirement age of 2 years increasing labour force participation by
only 2 to 4.5 percentage points. These results suggest that OECD pension reforms
may not have a large impact on older male labour force participation rates.

The labour force discouragement variable (UNEMP) was significant in all models. A
1 percentage point increase in the prime age unemployment rate decreases labour
force participation rates by approximately 0.8 to 0.9 percentage points for males 5559 and by around 2 to 2.4 percentage points for males aged 60-64. Therefore, a labour
market policy to reduce unemployment by 1 percentage point would have a larger
effect than the hypothetical pension reforms above to increase older worker labour
force participation. It would therefore appear that the ILO recommendation to
encourage full employment, or at the very least to stimulate the labour demand, could
be effective in increasing older worker labour force participation to address ageing
society concerns. Note, however, this model does not take account of possible
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inflationary effects of this proposed policy nor the natural rate of unemployment or
NAIRU.

Finally, evidence of crowding out of the labour market of older males by younger
prime aged workers is evident. A 1 percentage point increase in the percentage of
prime aged males amongst the working age male population decreases labour force
participation of those 55-59 by around 0.7 to 1 percentage point and approximately
1.1 to 1.2 percentage points for those 60-64. This suggests that there is evidence that
the baby boomer generation may have crowded out older workers when they were
prime aged workers in the 1970’ and 80’s when this variable was at its highest values.
On an optimistic note, a symptom of ageing populations is that the proportion of
prime aged males in the labour force aged male population is now on a downward
trend, thereby relaxing this aggregate constraint that crowded out older workers in the
past. The baby boomers may therefore not experience the same pressure to exit the
labour market as the preceding generation of older workers. Model results suggest
that increased labour force participation rates of older workers observed in the early to
mid 2000’s would have predominantly been the result of strong labour markets and a
decline in the proportion of prime aged males amongst the labour force aged
population rather than the recently enacted pension reforms.
All models allowing for country specific slope terms offer increased adjusted R2
values compared to the basic fixed effects models, indicating an increased level of
explanatory power after allowing for a decrease in degrees of freedom. Furthermore,
we observe a large amount of variation in these slopes across different countries. The
models that allow for country specific slope terms offer very interesting insights for
pension reform policy. The financial incentives for labour force exit are generally
stronger than the basic model in Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, and
Portugal indicating scope in these countries for pension reforms to increase labour
force participation. Most of these countries have relatively high implicit taxes.
However, the implicit tax on continued work coefficient is insignificant or even
positive for both older age groups in half the countries listed, namely, Australia,
Canada, Italy, Norway, Spain and the US. Australia, Canada, Norway and the US
have quite low implicit taxes but this cannot be said for Italy and Spain. Therefore,
these findings are in contrast to Gruber and Wise (1998) that removing implicit taxes
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will reverse older worker early retirement trends. Indeed, the current results imply that
pension reform policies to decrease the implicit tax on continued work would be
ineffective in increasing older labour force participation in many countries.

In contrast, the role of unemployment in the labour market is a significant negative
influence on both age groups’ labour force participation in all countries except
Canada, Finland, Norway and Sweden. A 1 percentage point increase in prime age
unemployment rates is estimated to decrease labour force participation in Australia,
France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain by over 1 percentage
point for males 55-59 and by between 2 and 5 percentage points for those aged 60-64.
Of note is that Australia, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal had unemployment
pensions or unemployment benefit schemes that had long duration and / or exempted
active job search for older males from the 1970’s, thereby allowing labour force exit
during higher unemployment times observed in the period of analysis. Furthermore,
Australia, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands had labour market related criteria in
their disability pensions, also generally enacted in the 1970’s and 1980’s, allowing
another possible labour force exit in periods of higher unemployment (Blöndal and
Scarpetta 1998). Therefore, these OECD countries would seem to neatly fit within the
reserve army of labour hypothesis whereby older workers could easily be removed
from the labour force largely via social security exits in times of excess labour supply.
Furthermore, results would indicate that policies to decrease unemployment would
complement pension reform policies in France, Germany, The Netherlands and
Portugal where both pension and unemployment variables are significant, and perhaps
even substitute for pension reform in other countries where the pension reform
coefficients were insignificant. At the very least, findings from these models allowing
country specific coefficients imply that different policy tools are required in different
OECD countries and not a one policy fits all approach.
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Models for Males 55-59
Intercept

SSRRit

88.373
[0.000]
-0.133
[0.000]

ITAX 55it
RETAGEit
UNEMPit
PRIMEit

0.698
[0.000]
-0.793
[.000]
-0.777
[0.000]

142.045
[0.000]

-0.078
[0.000]
0.064
[0.694]
-0.883
[0.000]
-0.990
[0.000]

Country Specific Slope
Coefficients
Australia
Canada
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
US

No. of obs
2

R
R2
F statistic
LLC
ADF
PP

442
0.848
0.843
158.945
[0.000]
-5.522
[0.000]
58.136
[0.000]
61.555
[0.000]

406
0.856
0.851
154.626
[0.000]
-5.393
[0.000]
57.846
[0.000]
59.392
[0.000]

121.248
[0.000]

0.240
[0.252]
-0.816
[0.000]
-0.847
[0.000]

150.007
[0.000]

-0.084
[0.000]
0.041
[0.822]

-1.086
[0.000]

ITAX 55it

UNEMPit

0.901
[0.000]
-0.623
[0.092]
-0.127
[0.000]
-0.223
[0.000]
-0.060
[0.064]
0.107
[0.000]
-0.135
[0.000]
0.347
[0.117]
-0.212
[0.000]
0.012
[0.899]
-0.043
[0.136]
0.555
[0.000]

-1.836
[0.000]
-0.050
[0.845]
-0.120
[0.382]
-1.344
[0.000]
-1.294
[0.000]
-3.290
[0.000]
-1.097
[0.000]
0.684
[0.032]
-1.072
[0.009]
-1.054
[0.000]
-0.209
[0.226]
-0.872
[0.005]

406
0.890
0.882
117.865
[0.000]
-6.285
[0.000]
71.355
[0.000]
73.079
[0.000]

406
0.896
0.889
125.629
[0.000]
-5.946
[0.000]
67.890
[0.000]
67.721
[0.000]
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Table 5. Fixed Effects Models for Males 60-64 years
Intercept

SSRRit

5.503
[0.799]
-0.284
[0.000]

ITAX 60it
RETAGEit
UNEMPit
PRIMEit

2.250
[0.000]
-1.968
[0.000]
-1.135
[0.000]

41.834
[0.000]

-0.137
[0.000]
1.331
[0.000]
-2.393
[0.000]
-1.203
[0.000]

Country Specific Slope
Coefficients
Australia
Canada
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
US

No. of obs
2

R
R2
F statistic
LLC
ADF
PP

455
0.840
0.834
153.234
[0.000]
-6.870
[0.000]
80.133
[0.000]
71.028
[0.000]

419
0.843
0.837
144.257
[0.000]
-6.524
[0.000]
79.636
[0.000]
64.749
[0.000]

18.125
[0.515]

2.277
[0.000]
-2.401
[0.000]
-1.555
[0.000]

119.432
[0.000]

-0.134
[0.000]
1.043
[0.006]

-1.891
[0.000]

ITAX 60it

UNEMPit

-0.070
[0.699]
1.006
[0.005]
-0.179
[0.002]
-0.0827
[0.215]
-0.361
[0.000]
0.037
[0.491]
-0.417
[0.000]
0.249
[0.195]
-0.162
[0.007]
0.106
[0.506]
-0.120
[0.001]
0.221
[0.152]

-3.017
[0.000]
0.021
[0.974]
-1.326
[0.000]
-4.078
[0.000]
-4.139
[0.000]
-4.841
[0.000]
-2.156
[0.000]
0.061
[0.927]
-2.282
[0.000]
-2.062
[0.000]
-1.453
[0.000]
-2.166
[0.000]

419
0.863
0.854
94.809
[0.000]
-6.891
[0.000]
88.678
[0.000]
71.630
[0.000]

419
0.879
0.871
109.089
[0.000]
-6.343
[0.000]
73.305
[0.000]
67.701
[0.000]
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All of the above models specified in levels represent long run relationships.
Furthermore, the stationary residuals from these models indicated quite stable and
well specified relationships. However, also of interest to this study are the short run or
dynamic relationships between these variables in OECD countries, which have not
been explored until now. The residuals from the basic fixed effects models were
saved, lagged one period, and used as error correction terms in their respective short
run models. Thus all variables used in the following models are I(0). For simplicity,
these models are estimated using country specific fixed effects, but not country
specific slopes.

Results for these short run models are contained in Table 6. Residuals from these
models are once again stationary. The adjusted R 2 values are noticeably lower than
those for the long run models, however, they are not directly comparable because of a
different dependent variable and lower explanatory power is generally expected from
a short run dynamic model specified in first differences.

All coefficients are of the expected sign, however, the coefficients for the pension
financial variables are not significant at the 1% level. Therefore, results indicate that
pension reform policies to decrease the financial value of pensions will not have an
immediate impact. Surprisingly, a change in the standard retirement age was
estimated to have an impact in the short run. However, there is only limited scope to
alter this variable and any policy to increase the standard age of retirement would
typically be phased in over a relatively long period. In contrast, coefficiens attached to
both aggregate labour market constraint variables, UNEMP and PRIME, are
significant and larger in magnitude than financial pension coefficients. Finally, the
error correction terms indicate that any deviation from the long run model is only
corrected or adjusted by around 10 % in the following year, indicating a quite slow
adjustment to the long run relationship. In summary, the largely insignificant
influence of financial variables for pension reform, significant influence of the labour
market constraints, and relatively slow adjustment toward the long run model gives
added weight to the labour market focus recommended by ILO policies.
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Table 6. Short Run Error Correction Models
ΔLFPR55it
Intercept
ΔSSRRit

-0.172
[0.021]
-0.031
[0.258]

ΔITAX 55it

ΔLFPR60it
-0.228
[0.004]

-0.522
[0.000]
-0.076
[0.031]

-0.0329
[0.0478]

ΔITAX 60it
ΔRETAGEit
ΔUNEMPit
ΔPRIMEit
ECM it −1
No. of obs
2

R
R2
F statistic
LLC
ADF
PP

-0.672
[0.000]

0.841
[0.001]
-0.305
[0.000]
-0.541
[0.000]
-0.111
[0.000]

0.7853
[0.003]
-0.308
[0.000]
-0.536
[0.000]
-0.117
[0.000]

1.484
[0.000]
-0.550
[0.000]
-0.377
[0.004]
-0.101
[0.000]

-0.018
[0.315]
1.369
[0.000]
-0.529
[0.000]
-0.355
[0.000]
-0.110
[0.000]

430
0.140

394
0.156

443
0.241

407
0.262

0.106

0.120

0.212

0.231

4.187
[0.000]
-18.248
[0.000]
325.387
[0.000]
325.361
[0.000]

4.356
[0.000]
-18.006
[0.000]
309.837
[0.000]
310.449
[0.000]

8.445
[0.000]
-13.223
[0.000]
240.655
[0.000]
275.841
[0.000]

8.636
[0.000]
-13.944
[0.000]
236.062
[0.000]
254.254
[0.000]

Section 6 - Conclusions and Policy Implications
The findings from both long run and short run dynamic econometric models
emphasise the role of labour market variables over social security disincentives for
employment, and also country specific causal factors, for explaining older worker
labour force participation in the long run. Policies to reduce unemployment would
appear to have a larger influence in increasing labour force participation rather than
restriction to pensions or decreasing financial generosity. Indeed, the implication from
model results was that recent increases in older male labour force participation rates
from the year 2000 was likely to be the result of declining prime age unemployment
rates and easing of crowding out pressures rather than the result of recently enacted
pension reforms. However, the role of the labour market is largely ignored in OECD
policy prescriptions to address an ageing society. It would therefore appear as if the
recent pension reforms to address ageing populations are now out of character with
the reserve army of labour hypothesis that has operated in many countries over recent
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decades. That is, there is apparent asymmetry in the role of the government within this
hypothesis. There is ample evidence of governments in many countries being party to
the removal or exit of older males during periods of excess labour supply. Examples
range from being indirect or passive through social security eligibility allowing exit
via unemployment benefits design or labour market criteria in disability pensions, to
very active with Job Release Schemes. However, pension reforms to increase older
worker labour force participation would now seem to precede actual labour shortages
in the future, and furthermore be predominantly based on fiscal considerations, rather
than aggregate labour market conditions.

While there appears to be an explicit recognition of the disadvantage faced by older
workers in the labour market within the OECD research, there is an unwillingness to
push a strong active policy stance on labour demand and employment. The lack of
demand and employment policy reflects a lack of priority to this area and a level of
reluctance on the part of the OECD. While a bulk of detailed OECD pension reform
literature has been conducted backing up their pension policy reform stance, they
meekly cite a lack of research for a lack of older worker employment policy
formulation. This preoccupation with pension reform means that supply side policy
affecting the relative price and availability of non-wage income is the predominant
policy tool recommended to address an ageing society. While this may ease concerns
over future budget exposure, it is argued that this policy stance is inequitable and
merely shifts the financial responsibility of unemployment or retirement to the
individual, and does little to address deficient aggregate labour demand and the labour
market disadvantage faced by older workers. It is therefore suggested that many
countries would stimulate older worker labour force participation by adhering to the
ILO policy focus on a healthy labour market rather than relying solely on OECD
pension reform policy.

Finally, future research will incorporate panel unit root tests allowing for structural
breaks, inclusion of superannuation or private saving variables, and a regime
switching model to test for asymmetric responses to independent variables.
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